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This article assesses the question of media concentration in the European Union 
(EU) in the context of the regulatory approaches taken by the Member States and 
the EU. It argues, despite common perceptions that the EU’s approach to pro-
tecting media pluralism is governed by a purely market approach, it is also en-
trenched in a significant public interest basis. It argues that media concentration 
is increasing due to the weakening of a commitment as to the importance placed 
on the protection of media pluralism by the Member States. Subsequently national 
governments are supporting national champions and removing regulatory barri-
ers for company growth in order to protect their own market players while at the 
same time enabling national companies to exploit even greater economies of scale 
by expanding into neighbouring countries both within the EU and outside of the 
area. At the same time the growth of the European Commission (EC) as a key 
regulator in the area of competition policy at the Community level has reshaped 
the scope of national regulation in this field. In this respect, a policy at the EU 
level has been to employ competition policy in order to support European Cham-
pions that are able to exploit greater size on the global market, but also to protect 
media pluralism on a national level by allowing media companies to expand in the 
different media markets across the common market zone.  
These contrasting policy trajectories will be discussed by reviewing the ECs media 
related decisions, and the article will conclude that although individual Member 
States retain the right to enforce media concentration regulations under the 
merger regulation there appears to be little will on behalf of many of the major 
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Member States to support media pluralism. This inevitably leaves a regulatory 
void between national and supranational regulatory spheres and the issue of me-
dia concentration is neglected in favour of companies and to the detriment of me-
dia pluralism. 
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 This article outlines the European Commission’s (EC) approach to media 
competition and pluralism and assesses how the EC framework for media concen-
tration fits together with national approaches to protecting media pluralism and 
analyses the West European experience in the interaction between the Member 
States and the EC’s policies in this field. It is therefore concerned with structural 
pluralism and the perceived need to constantly maintain a diversity of actors and 
outlets in the television sector throughout Western Europe. The idea that the media 
sector should be diverse is underpinned by a belief that in a democratic society, it 
is important for all members to have access to a broad range of views and opinions 
to enable individuals to make an informed choice on a variety of public matters. In 
this sense the public policy instruments that are employed both at the European 
Union (EU) and Member State levels are vital in maintaining levels of diversity of 
pluralism in the media sector and changes in the character of the framework em-
ployed to regulate media concentration have a fundamental impact on concentra-
tion itself - a fairly obvious, but important point. 
 I want to suggest that there are fundamental problems in the current approach 
as the Member States introduce greater levels of liberalisation to support national 
champions that operate on global markets and the EC attempts to protect national 
pluralism by encouraging broadcasters to operate on a European level across mar-
kets. The architecture of such a complex system of national and European regula-
tion suffers from a systemic weakness if the Member States do not provide suffi-
cient legal provisions for media pluralism and the EC is limited in both its range 
and scope of instruments and legal remit to protect media pluralism against con-
centration. In such a system the Member States are responsible for regulating the 
growing media concentration on their individual markets and are the key force in 
regulatory shifts that have allowed media companies to expand by merger and ac-
quisition, reducing the pluralism of these markets. They are therefore central both 
to the issue of media pluralism and concentration and will continue to be so in the 
coming years, despite arguments to the contrary. 
 At the same time, as media companies grow, there will be a far greater role for 
the EC as mergers or acquisitions reach the thresholds set out in the Merger 
Regulation (CEC, 2004) and therefore fall under the competence of the EC for in-
vestigation. In this context it is important to understand that the EC Merger Regu-
lation is limited to competition issues and consumer interest and it does not deal 
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with pluralism over and above what is necessary to ensure open competition. The 
EC recognises the limits of its Merger Regulation and as a result there is a caveat 
in the Merger Regulation allowing Member States to introduce measures that 
guarantee a plural and diverse media sector as the primary regulatory instrument 
to protect the public’s right to have access to a diverse range of media. 
 The first part of this article discusses the trends and instruments that are cur-
rently employed by a selection of Member States in order to regulate media con-
centration and outlines the actual levels of concentration in the television industry 
in a selection of countries. The second part outlines the EC’s approach to market 
concentration. The article concludes with an assessment of where the liberalisation 
of ownership rules by the Member States is leading and what kind of public policy 
instruments will be the dominant tools in the future years. 
 
National approaches to media concentration 
 Traditional approaches to regulating media concentration and pluralism are 
premised on a human rights argument that contemporary citizenship is based on 
certain rights, and, one of these rights is to have access to a diverse and plural me-
dia sector. The argument has evolved from a long history in political thought that 
has established media pluralism as a fundamental component in the democratic 
structures of modern societies that is shared throughout the EU. 
 However, despite the underpinnings of the ideal of media pluralism having 
equal application across Europe, national approaches to media concentration differ 
significantly. The Member States employ a wide range of regulatory instruments 
that aim to guarantee media diversity and by this very fact attempt to militate 
against concentration of ownership. Although all West European countries have 
some provisions to ensure plural media markets, the methods used as well as the 
frameworks within which media concentration is regulated vary considerably. In a 
highly dynamic market this is a consequence of the diverse market conditions in 
the different countries and the different approaches taken to the media sector in 
general by policy-makers. 
 The instruments employed in Europe range from ceilings for market share that 
a broadcaster is allowed (and traditionally in Italy also financial ceilings) and di-
versity in terms of shareholders (France) to less media-specific rules that are built 
on the concept of retaining fair competition in markets. In some cases there are 
special provisions for mergers or acquisitions involving media companies (UK); in 
other cases the media fall within the same competition rules as any other industrial 
sector (Sweden). 
 Across Western Europe there are basically two models of media concentration 
regulation with most Member States employing some instruments in combination 
with one another. However, competition policy has become a growing part of this 
overall regulatory framework as any merger or acquisition in the media industry 
today involves a set of economic considerations of the impact on the nature of the 
market under review. Today, although a patchwork of different instruments are 
used to support media pluralism, competition policy has become the most promi-
nent instrument across Western Europe, and it is becoming increasingly central as 
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West European countries look to adjust their regulatory frameworks to account for 




Table 1: Overview of regulatory approaches to media concentration 
 
Country Press Television Radio Cross-media 

























Netherlands Competition Competition Competition Competition 
UK Competition Competition Competition Thresholds 
Source: Ward 2004 
 
 Another common trend is that over the past decade most Member States, if not 
all, have liberalised and relaxed their ownership restrictions that pertain to televi-
sion or are in the process of doing so. These changes have been driven by three 
factors: technological developments, the liberalisation of the world economy and 
the changing nature of public policy. They have combined to reshape policy and 
partially shift the principles that have guided policy-making in the broadcasting 
sector that is most notably evident in the policies of the larger Member States in 
supporting national champions who are able to exploit the international television 
market place and thereby create opportunities in employment and economic 
growth for the individual Member States.  
 
Media concentration in Western Europe 
 Television concentration in Europe has grown at a rapid rate since the 
introduction of commercial television and the break up of the public service mo-
nopolies in the majority of European countries in the 1980s. In many respects, plu-
ralism in the television sector has remained restricted due to the fact that spectrum 
has remained scarce even considering the growth of multichannel television 
households. Despite forecasts for a plethora of channels brought about through 
satellite and cable, the majority of multichannel television households in Europe 
receive fewer than 30 channels. Digitalisation remains underdeveloped in the ma-
jority of countries in Europe and only in the UK has it made a significant impact 
on the television landscape. Also, contrary to arguments that suggested multichan-
nel television would solve the problem of media concentration, the existence of 
more channels has simply increased the power of a few corporations as they have 
either expanded their interests into other channels (RTL) or have control over im-
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portant bottlenecks such as Electronic Programme Guides and conditional access 
systems (BSkyB). Large commercial broadcasting groups, which, in some cases, 
have become international players operating across the culture industries, have be-
come significant players in the television markets of Europe. 
 These markets are extremely varied in terms of size and characteristics. Bel-
gium and Luxembourg have highly internationalised markets with internal divi-
sions reflecting linguistic divisions in their populations. Furthermore, Luxembourg 
is unique in that, due to the small size of its population, RTL has a government 
granted monopoly in the market with no domestic competition from other opera-
tors. 
 
Chart 1: Television audience share of public and leading commercial television 
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 Outside these linguistically divided markets a group of countries consisting of 
Italy followed by Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden demonstrate the highest 
degrees of concentration in the countries included in the chart above. From this 
group the duopoly in Italy represents the highest degree of concentration with two 
players RAI and Mediaset carving up the market on an almost equal basis. Finally, 
a third group consisting of the Flemish-speaking community of Belgium, of Spain 
and the UK have lesser degrees of concentration, although they remain highly 
concentrated.  
 The general trend in the markets that are not highly fragmented along linguistic 
lines is that the public service broadcaster plus two other major broadcasters 
dominate the market. The least degree of concentration in the television sector is 
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bined market share of 69.9 per cent of the audience, making it the most plural 
market with a further 30.1 per cent of audience share commanded by other broad-
casters, though this is mainly enjoyed by the fifth terrestrial channel, Channel 
Five, and the channels offered by BSkyB that somewhat increases the overall level 
of concentration. 
 All of these markets are therefore what economists would call highly concen-
trated and therefore represent oligopolies. The number of operators is seriously 
limited, not only by spectrum scarcity, but by the simple fact that the economics of 
television favour companies that enjoys large economies of scale.  
 
The EU framework 
 The importance of media diversity is set out in a number of EU texts that ac-
knowledge the importance of the media in the democratic life of EU citizens, most 
importantly Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Un-
ion, which has been incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty.  
 Despite these acknowledgements in key Community texts the main tool em-
ployed by the EC to regulate media concentration is competition policy and the 
Merger Regulation that was modernised in 2004 to introduce procedural reform 
for dealing with mergers and acquisition cases (CEC, 1989, revised 1997 and 
2004). The Competition Directorate is responsible for making rulings on market 
concentrations under Article 3 (1) (g) of the EC Treaty subject to review by the 
European Court of Justice. Based on the EC Treaty the Merger Regulation grants 
the EC powers to either intervene in, or request changes and conditions to clear a 
merger or acquisition, to clear a merger or acquisition, or to block and indeed re-
verse a merger or acquisition where it finds that there is a negative effect on com-
petition in the relevant market. 
 In this sense the Competition Directorate has a very specific remit and its cen-
tral principles in the area of competition are guided by the objective to ensure that 
price competition, wide consumer choice and developments in the market such as 
technological innovation support European economies and increase their competi-
tiveness on the global market. In this respect, the rules are applied to all sectors 
equally, including the television industry. Undertakings involved in any proposed 
venture are obliged to give prior notification of concentrations where the parties to 
the proposed project have global sales revenue that crosses a set threshold. After 
consideration of the impact on the relevant market, the EC can clear the proposed 
deal, refer the proposal to the participants requesting amendments and conditions 
of acceptance, or reject the proposed venture as incompatible with the principles 
of the common market. The thresholds where a merger or acquisition qualifies for 
investigation by the EC are established according to Article 1, paragraph 2 (a & b) 
of the Merger Regulation 2004 as: 
• An aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned of more 
than EUR 5 billion. 
• An aggregate Community wide turnover of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than EUR 250 million. 
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 Whilst the principles set out in the Merger Regulation apply to all industries 
equally there is a caveat in the regulation that is designed to allow Member States 
to take appropriate measures to ensure that public interest issues that lie outside 
the scope of the Merger Regulation are adequately accounted for. Media pluralism 
is explicitly mentioned in this context as an area where a Member State may pro-
tect, as a legitimate interest, the diversity of the media (CEC, 2004, Article 21, 
paragraph 4). Under this regime Member States retain the right, under Community 
Law, to maintain a stricter regulatory framework to ensure media diversity is pre-
served. 
 Nevertheless, the EC has become increasingly central in deciding cases involv-
ing mergers and acquisitions as media companies have grown during the past dec-
ade and many of the largest media companies qualify for investigation due to their 
turnovers crossing the thresholds outlined above. As Table 2 illustrates the largest 
players in the European television market surpass the turnover threshold and there-
fore any mergers or acquisition that includes these companies automatically trig-
gers a Community dimension and an EC investigation into the impact on competi-
tion of the proposed acquisition, merger or joint venture. 
 
Table 2: Turnover of top television/media companies in Europe 2002 
 







turnover € mil 
Vivendi FR 28,112   70          19,558 
Bertelsmann DE 18,312    80          14,612 
ARD DE   6,100 100 6,100 
BBC UK   5,383 100 5,383 
RTL Group DE   4,342 100 4,342 
Lagardere FR 13,216   28 3,746 
BSkyB UK   3,622 100 3,622 
RAI UK   2,700 100 2,700 
TF1 FR   2,325 100 2,325 
Mediaset IT   2,316 100 2,316 
Bonnier SW   1,910 100 1,910 
Source: Nordicom 2003 
 
 The Merger Regulation is therefore based on ad hoc investigations and there 
are no rules or ceilings set out for media concentration as have been employed tra-
ditionally in some of the Member States. It is also difficult, given the diversity of 
market characteristics in the Member States to envisage an alternative system 
other than the one currently employed by the EC, despite the fact that throughout 
the 1990s the EC worked on a Green Paper on media concentration that was 
eventually rejected by the Member States through the Council of Ministers. In the 
past decade there have been a growing number of merger cases referred to the EC 
either by Member States competition authorities or directly by the proposed part-
ners in a venture. These cases have allowed the EC to build up precedents defining 
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the audiovisual market and as a result setting out certain parameters of acceptable 
concentrations across the European audiovisual markets. 
 
The European Commission’s Decisions 
 These decisions broadly concern two types of cases: the first type addressing 
alliances between companies active in different geographic markets, and the sec-
ond alliances between companies in the same geographic market.  
 
National markets 
 The first kind of alliances which the EC has been called upon to assess are 
based on national television markets and occur either between actors in the same 
geographic market, who propose a venture: 1) between existing actors in the sup-
ply chain within an established market; 2) an alliance to exploit a new national 
market; 3) or a venture which increases competition in an existing market. In the 
latter two areas the EC has taken a positive approach, even granting derogations to 
competition rules to new entrants in markets where a large amount of risk or 
capital investment is involved (Ward, 2002, 2004). The EC has cleared most of 
these proposals as pro-competitive. It has however, blocked alliances where it has 
judged that the proposed merger under review would have a negative impact on, 
either the development of the market, or where it is likely to lead to the demise of 
the number of actors operating in a specific market. 
 The negative decisions that have been handed down by the EC in many re-
spects lay down the logic and limits of its application of competition policy in this 
area. The first of these was the MSG Media Service proposal (CEC, 1994) the 
participants of which, informed the EC in June 1994 of a proposed joint venture 
between Bertelsmann, Deutsche Telekom and Taurus, a holding company of the 
Kirch Group. The venture between the leading actors, providing a range of com-
munications services in Germany, was established with the intention of setting up 
a jointly owned independent company (MSG). The company proposed to provide 
a number of technical services including conditional access systems, subscription 
management services and content to support the development of pay-TV in Ger-
many. Even though the company was a stand alone undertaking, and granted inde-
pendence from the parties, the EC judged the venture amounted to a monopoly 
over pay-TV in Germany and based its objections on the fact that the resulting 
monopoly over pay-TV for the venture, would lead to the foreclosure of the market.  
 Four years later the EC also vetoed a similar proposal, once again in Germany, 
where CLT Ufa and Kirch, would have acquired joint control of Premiere pay-TV 
as well as Beta digital, the sister company of Kirch which developed and manu-
factured the d-box conditional access system. In a second part of the proposal CLT 
Ufa, Kirch and Deutsche Telekom would have taken over the company BetaRe-
search (CEC, 1999a). The EC demanded a whole gamut of concessions that would 
loosen the monopoly hold that the group would acquire through the joint venture, 
in very much the same way as the proposal four years previously would have. Al-
though some of these were met, they were insufficient to convince the EC that a 
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long term monopoly position would not be achieved through the venture. It was 
eventually vetoed by the EC on the grounds of unacceptable dominance in the 
pay-TV market, which it concluded would lead to a dominant monopoly position 
for the parties, and exclude the possibility of new competitors entering the market 
in a similar manner as in the previous case. 
 The EC was unwilling to accept such a monopoly in this area and remained un-
convinced by the argument presented by the interested parties. Short-term devel-
opment of the digital platform was sacrificed to the importance that the EC placed 
on the long-term objective of competition between undertakings in the sector, 
where the establishment of a monopoly, which would automatically foreclose the 
market and exclude new competitors entering the market at a later date was seen 
to be the outcome of the joint venture.  
 The second merger case involving the media sector that has been rejected by 
the EC was concerned with a request by the Dutch authorities for the EC to ex-
amine a joint venture that formed the Holland Media Groep SA (HMG), which 
consisted of RTL 4, Vereniging Veronica Omroeporganisatie (HMG) and the in-
dependent producer Endemol Entertainment. The parties applied for clearance for 
the formation of a new company HMG with the intention to supply and package 
programmes to be broadcast by HMG, CLT and Veronica. The basic aim of the 
merger was to combine the resources of the three channels, whilst folding the in-
dependent production company Endemol into the company to supply the pro-
gramming production base and thus preferential access for the channels to Ende-
mol’s programming (CEC, 1995). 
 The broadcasters involved in the venture all held significant positions in areas 
of the Dutch free-to-air television market with RTL commanding 26 per cent of 
overall audience market share. The EC estimated that RTL 3 and Veronica to-
gether held a significant share of the audience that would lead to a dominant ven-
ture in Dutch commercial television. Endemol, which is the largest independent 
production house in the EU also held a wide portfolio of programming and oper-
ated in the Netherlands, Germany, France, the UK and Spain, as well as in a num-
ber of other countries.  
 Concerns about the dominant position created by the new company HMG on 
the free-to-air television market were raised, especially in respect to the advertis-
ing market. The EC ruled that HMG, given the participants and arrangements, 
would obtain a dominant position in the television advertising market, with a share 
that was estimated to be as much as 60 per cent of the total market. The parties ar-
gued that the venture did not represent such a dominant position because of the 
presence of the commercial broadcaster SBS, which began transmitting in 1995. 
Such a strong competitor, it was argued by the partners in the joint venture, repre-
sented a serious competitor to HMG and therefore the alliance did not create a 
dominant individual actor. The EC disagreed, concluding, that due to CLT Ufa’s 
already strong position in the market and with market forecast rates for advertising 
at eight per cent growth, the strengthening of its position through the merger 
would seriously inhibit the possibility of SBS developing a comparable market po-
sition. Therefore, HMG would enjoy a dominant market position and this would 
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seriously hinder the opportunity for new entrants to enter the market for free-to-air 
television services. 
 The EC reached the conclusion that the merger between the parties represented 
a concentration which created an unacceptable dominant position in the television 
advertising market in the Netherlands and furthermore led to the strengthening of 
Endemol in the market for independent Dutch language television production; a 
market of which, even before the merger, it already claimed a significant share. As 
a result it judged the proposed merger incompatible with the common market and 
Article 8 (3) in conjunction with Article 22 (3) of the Merger Regulation. More-
over, as HMG had already been set up, and the threat to competitive markets al-
ready established, the EC subsequently announced measures to restore satisfactory 
competition in these markets under Article 8 (4) of the Merger Regulation. 
 The EC advised the parties of the appropriate measures required to restore 
effective competition in the market for advertising and independent television 
production in the Netherlands. As a result, in 1996, the parties returned to the EC 
with a revised proposal, significantly without the Endemol component. The EC 
cleared the venture as compatible with the common market as the risk of market 
dominance in the advertising and programme production markets were signifi-
cantly reduced by the revised plans. In a later decision the EC cleared the acquisi-
tion of Endemol by the Spanish company, Telefónica, the former state monopoly 
telecommunications company, (CEC, 2000a) where it was judged no significant 




 The majority of EC decisions on alliances have been taken on ventures, which 
cover different geographic markets, which it sees as not posing competition prob-
lems due to the fact that there is little or no geographic overlap. A venture of this 
kind is perceived, according to the EC’s approach, to increase competition in any 
one market rather than reduce market actors. 
 Therefore joint ventures like the Audiofina and Bertelsmann case, which re-
sulted in the formation of CLT Ufa have been cleared on the basis that the partici-
pants operated on separate national markets (CEC, 1996). Although the creation of 
CLT Ufa/RTL represents the establishment of one of Europe’s biggest broadcast-
ers it is characterised by a spread across different markets and is, as a result, 
deemed pro-competitive rather than anti-competitive. Despite arguments to the 
contrary that suggested the establishment of CLT Ufa/RTL would lead to a domi-
nant position throughout Europe, due to the competitive advantages conferred in 
areas such as programme acquisition rights, the EC concluded that because the 
sale of rights to television programmes was undertaken at a national level, the 
combination of resources in CLT Ufa/RTL was not sufficient to block the synergy. 
 The most striking evidence of the EC’s pro-competitive understanding of pan-
European mergers is with the Kirch/ Bertelsmann vetoes discussed above and the 
later clearance given to a proposed alliance between BSkyB and the Kirch Group 
(CEC, 2000b). The BSkyB/ Kirch proposal consisted of BSkyB acquiring 24 per 
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cent of the ill-fated KirchPayTV GmbH & Co. KgaA (Kirch TV) from Kirch 
Vermögensverwaltungs GmbH & Co. KG, the holding company for the Kirch 
Group. In combining the resources of the two companies, the venture would sup-
posedly achieve a considerable position on the German market for BSkyB and re-
inforce the strong position enjoyed by Kirch through a bouquet of film and sports 
channels offered in a variety of packages under the brand name Premiere.  
 The case had obvious parallels with the earlier two cases in Germany that the 
EC had blocked. The central difference being that BSkyB did not hold a signifi-
cant market presence in either the German pay-TV or free-to-air television mar-
kets. The decision has a number of features in common with the previous MSG 
proposals. However, a crucial difference was that unlike the MSG case both of the 
participants in the joint venture did not have a strong position on the relevant 
German market and in reality did not compete on the German market with one an-
other. Whereas the MSG cases included the two most powerful German commer-
cial broadcasters, the BSkyB/ Kirch proposal, although significantly reinforcing 
Kirch’s position, was judged not to be anti-competitive to the extent that the mar-
ket in question would exclude Bertelsmann or other actors from entering and 
competing in the market against Premiere. 
 At the time of the decision, Kirch was clearly struggling to build a subscriber 
base and to gain a market position against a highly competitive free-to-air televi-
sion market that already provided an average of 30 channels via cable or satellite. 
BSkyB’s interests in the German market in free-to-air broadcasting consisted of 
the channel TM3, and at the time of the proposed joint venture with Kirch BSkyB 
were negotiating to sell its stake in the channel. However, it held a considerable 
market position in other national markets, most notably in the UK. 
 It was argued by Kirch’s competitors that the alliance would be detrimental to 
competition in the German pay-TV market as BSkyB was a potential new entrant 
and thus a potential competitor to the existing Kirch platform and by allowing the 
alliance such competition would be precluded. The EC judged however, that this 
was unlikely due to the commitments of BSkyB in developing a range of new ser-
vices on their digital satellite platform in the UK. As a result BSkyB was unlikely 
to enter the German pay-TV market, and because its existing shares in the free-to-
air channel did not compete with Kirch in the pay-TV market, the alliance was 
deemed pro-competitive. 
 The EC raised concerns over the conditional access system developed by the 
sister company of KirchPayTV, BetaResearch, as the system is a “closed decoder” 
so the opportunity for Kirch to foreclose the digital pay-TV market was signifi-
cant. This was reinforced by the possibility raised by the alliance that both the ex-
pertise in marketing and the injection of revenues from BSkyB would bring about 
a dominant position in the German pay-TV market and raise barriers of entry. Due 
to this the EC stipulated the position would be tolerated on the condition that the 
d-box system, and therefore access to the digital platform, was open to other actors 
on a non-discriminatory basis. 
 A second reservation concerned the acquisition of programme rights by the 
new alliance. The two parties together presented an opportunity to exploit their 
joint position to acquire programme rights both in terms of collective purchasing 
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power and preferential selling to one another on the UK and German markets. 
However, as the EC defines markets as national in scope for the purposes of de-
fining the framework for its decisions, this was dismissed. 
 Despite serious reservations the EC cleared the proposal, with the reasoning 
that because of the pre-existing strength of the free-to-air market the development 
of digital pay-TV was faced with significant obstacles and therefore would need 
the impetus and resources that the merger offered. This was on the strict condition 
that Kirch agreed to the establishment of fair and non-discriminatory access to the 
d-box and therefore access to the delivery platform for content providers and 
competitors. 
 The most significant case affecting the television industry in the past couple of 
years has been the EC’s decision in 2003 to clear the takeover of Telepiù (owned 
by Vivendi) by its only competitor in the pay-TV market in Italy, News Corpora-
tion. News Corporation managed and held a 50 per cent stake in Stream, Telepiù’s 
only competitor in the Pay-TV market, with Telecom Italia holding another 50 per 
cent (both companies had increased their shareholdings in the company since its 
establishment in 1993). The case posed difficult questions in a market that had 
seen the growth of powerful operators, but very slow development in multichannel 
television services and an extremely strong free-to-air television market dominated 
by RAI and Mediaset. The two satellite operators were leaking money and clearly 
had struggled to build a subscription base for their pay-TV services (in a manner 
similar to Kirch in Germany). Although the Italian competition authorities had 
previously blocked an attempted merger between the two operators in 2002 
(Ward, 2002, 2004) the financial crisis at Vivendi and the poor performance of 
both operators eventually resulted in News Corporation making a takeover bid for 
Telepiù and proposing a merger of the two operators and a re-branding of the op-
erator as Sky Italia. 
 The lack of any realistic alternative purchaser only compounded the problem 
facing the EC as News Corporation argued that the continued existence of two 
platforms would simply lead to its own platform, Stream, withdrawing from the 
market. This would leave a monopoly position for Telepiù, and the financial crisis 
of Vivendi raised the possibility of both operators closing down their services in 
Italy. News Corporation even suggested that the merger needed to be understood 
under the concept of a “Rescue Merger”. It argued that without clearance of the 
takeover its own company Stream would file for bankruptcy and therefore the 
failing company defence’ principle that the EC had employed in two previous de-
cisions was applicable to the takeover of Telepiù, though in reverse as it would be 
Stream, its own company that closed its operations rather than the company “res-
cued” (CEC, 2003). 
 The end result would be a reduction of competition in the pay-TV market as ei-
ther one or possibly both of the operators withdrew from the market. The EC 
cleared the takeover, but only with a strict set of conditions. These involved a 
whole raft of commitments by News Corporation to soften the impact on the mar-
ket of the takeover, including an agreement by News Corporation as to the dives-
titure of Telepiù’s digital terrestrial television interests and a commitment not to 
enter the digital terrestrial television market. It also requested that News Corpora-
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tion provide a guarantee that the satellite platform and the conditional access sys-
tem would be open to competitors on a non-discriminatory basis. There were also 
significant concessions on programme rights that the two companies held before 
the takeover to ensure that competitors had access. Although Sky Italia was there-
fore allowed to acquire a monopoly position on the Italian pay-TV market (as well 
as a monopsony in terms of the packaging of channels) the EC conditions, given 
the circumstances, probably stretched as far as they could in retaining competition 
in the television market. 
 
Assessing the Overall Approach of the European Commission 
 The cases above represent only a small number of cases that have been investi-
gated by the EC under the Merger Regulation and most of the decisions that have 
included media companies have been positive. In sum this approach is favourable 
towards pro-competitive proposals where a new service or a new competitor is 
created through the venture. The framework developed by the Competition Di-
rectorate, to evaluate the consequences of either a joint venture or a merger be-
tween media companies, is based on the relevant or potential sources of supply on 
a market through a joint consideration of the market and the services offered to the 
consumer. To achieve this framework the EC defines the market where the activity 
has an impact, and subsequently by defining the market, the EC is able to assess 
the proposed venture based on market share. As a consequence, dominance by 
companies that hold strong positions in markets are accepted, as long as this is 
achieved through superior services and performance. Such dominance is not to be 
achieved through either a joint venture or merger. This same logic runs through 
the two German decisions involving Bertelsmann and Kirch and the original HMG 
decision. The EC has therefore employed competition policy to ensure competi-
tion in national markets remains open. At the same time it has looked positively on 
mergers and acquisitions where competition is increased either by a new entrant or 
new services on national markets. 
 The approach represents an innovative use of the common market in that it al-
lows companies to develop certain economies of scale across markets. That tech-
nically, at least, relieves the pressure on national markets for these companies to 
expand in the domestic markets. In light of the degree of concentration in the na-
tional markets there is little room for some of the largest media companies to ex-
pand without seriously further threatening media pluralism. In this context the EC 
has found a novel method of encouraging the growth of media companies in the 
EU by allowing them to expand across European markets, whilst at the same time 
preventing them from expanding within individual national markets to an extent 
whereby competition is threatened. Whilst the EC has supported alliances in both 
new markets and separate geographic markets, the negative decisions it has made 
signify that the limits of permissible alliances are at the Member State level. Al-
though national governments have been promoting national players by reducing 
their own regulations on media ownership, the EC has remained fairly constant in 
its decisions, attempting to promote pan-European market mergers rather than in-
dividual market concentrations. 
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 The Italian case involving Stream and Telepiù represents an important shift, 
not so much in the EC’s approach to competition, but in the current market for 
television services in the EU and the limits to current growth of platform competi-
tion as many Member States and commercial operators have employed business 
models and strategies that have failed to provide sustainable short term growth. 
The option the EC were faced with was to either clear the takeover or to block it 
and if it had chosen the latter the two platforms would have continued until the in-
evitable withdrawal of one or perhaps both operators at some point in the future. It 
is only with very strict conditions, which included deals on programme rights, ac-
cess to the platform and a commitment not to roll out digital terrestrial services 
that the EC cleared the proposal. 
 The EC’s role in media concentration is, however, limited. On one hand it only 
deals with mergers and acquisitions involving media companies that cross the 
Merger Regulation threshold. This ultimately means that an individual market can 
become extremely concentrated before a Community interest is invoked. In reality 
this means that only the big players in Europe fall within its remit. On the other 
hand, there is little that the EC envisages doing in terms of pluralism except for 
where it overlaps with competition policy. In this respect, although the Member 
States authority has been partially superseded by the EC when it comes to mergers 
and acquisitions of the largest media companies they remain the key actors in the 
regulation of media pluralism. Not only do they retain the right to enforce stricter 
measures to ensure media pluralism in their television markets under the rules of 
the Merger Regulation, but they are also the central agency that guarantees the 
right of their citizens to have access to a plural media. If media concentration lev-
els are unacceptable then it is the Member States that have provided the conditions 
for greater concentration and it is also the Member States that determine the terms 
of regulatory trade with broadcasters. 
 
Conclusion 
 For the EC’s framework to maintain pluralism it is necessary, under the princi-
ple of subsidiarity for the Member States to provide for media diversity and plu-
ralism. The EC appears to recognise competition policy alone is not always either 
the most suitable or adequate mechanism to guarantee media pluralism and the 
Member States hold the right to impose stricter regulations to guarantee media 
pluralism beyond what competition alone can protect. Most mergers and acquisi-
tions would also fall outside the scope of the EC’s Merger Regulation, though in-
creasingly all of the major players will qualify due to their growing turnovers. 
 The problem is that the Member States have, over the past decade, significantly 
liberalised their television sectors as a policy reaction to the changing environment 
for the industry and consumers. Ultimately, it is a failure of political vision and 
changes to public policy over the past decade will naturally affect the pluralism of 
the television systems across the EU. It should be stressed that this lack of fore-
sight is very much the domain of the Member States. 
 This failure has crucial consequences for media pluralism and the framework 
that has been built both at the Member State level and the interaction between the 
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EU and the Member States. Without the political will of the Member States to 
protect media pluralism the current framework is simply inadequate. The EC 
might have acted to protect competition in individual markets by promoting pan-
European strategies and providing negative decisions against mergers that have 
qualified for investigation on competition grounds that are perceived to threaten 
the pluralism on national markets, but the Member States have also been promot-
ing their own national champions. Whilst the EC has had the luxury of playing an 
enabling role to support European champions the Member States have demon-
strated far less vision. The main mechanism they have used to allow their compa-
nies to grow is a reduction of media ownership restrictions. This has inevitably re-
sulted in growing consolidation, which today, is reaching the ceilings set for me-
dia pluralism, where ceilings exist and are adhered to. If current trends continue, 
once these ceilings have been met the law will simply become redundant or the 
Member States are likely to simply lift the ceilings or change the regulatory 
framework. Both ways pluralism will be the victim in this process and consolida-
tion and industrial interests the victor. 
 On a final point, due to the fact that the EC has supported a policy of encourag-
ing larger European companies to adopt pan-European strategies to exploit greater 
economies of scale by pursuing growth across the European markets, and at the 
same time protecting pluralism in individual national markets where cases qualify 
for investigation an unforeseen consequence of this policy is that it has left the 
markets in the new and old Member States vulnerable to the expansion of a hand-
ful of West European companies. Given the size of these companies today, the EC 
is likely to be central in deciding whether the acquisitions and expansion of these 
companies threatens pluralism on individual markets. As these companies will be 
entering new markets it is unlikely that the EC Merger Regulation will be em-
ployed to block these. Leaving a handful of large media conglomerates of the 
West in an even more powerful position. In the final analysis there is little the EC 
could do to protect media pluralism at the Member State level within the current 
framework and it is crucial that the Member States protect pluralism as without 
such a framework the foundations of Community policy are swept away under the 
current regulatory regime. 
 Member States are finding it more difficult to strike the balance between the 
needs of the public and of the industry. This lack of vision in public policy is 
leading to a changing approach to concentration and an increasing move to com-
petition policy as the central instrument that Member States employ when decid-
ing on a merger and acquisition case. The system is politically convenient as 
boundaries that have previously been established to protect pluralism have been 
swept aside and replaced with a far more flexible framework where the goal posts 
can be moved to suit the prevailing trends in the television industry and political 
sphere. If competition policy is inadequate at the Community level to fully protect 
pluralism in the television sector then it is certainly insufficient for dealing with 
media pluralism and diversity at the Member State level. In this respect, the Mem-
ber States are increasingly failing to take advantage of their right to impose 
frameworks to guarantee that media concentration does not threaten media plural-
ism, and we can expect such concentration to increase. 
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Televizijski pluralizam i raznolikost i natjecateljska 




Članak propituje medijsku koncentraciju u Europskoj uniji (EU) u kontekstu re-
gulatornih pristupa koje su zauzele zemlje članice EU-a. Suprotstavlja se uobiča-
jenom mišljenju da je pristup Unije zaštiti medijskog pluralizma vođen isključivo 
tržišnim pristupom, te ističe kako je on zasnovan i na javnom interesu. Smatra se 
da medijska koncentracija raste zbog slabljenja obveze i važnosti koju zemlje čla-
nice pridaju zaštiti medijskog pluralizma. Nacionalne vlade podržavaju nacionalne 
prvake i uklanjaju regulatorne prepreke u rastu kompanija kako bi istodobno za-
štitile svoje tržišne igrače i omogućile nacionalnim kompanijama iskorištavanje 
većih ekonomija širenjem u susjedne zemlje, kako članice Unije tako i ostale. Is-
todobno, rast Europske Komisije (EC) koja je ključni regulator u području natjeca-
teljske politike na razini Unije preoblikovao je obujam nacionalnih regulativa na 
tom polju. Takva politika Unije služila je kao okidač natjecateljske politike kako 
bi se podržalo europske prvake koji su sposobni iskorištavati veći dio globalnog 
tržišta i štititi medijski pluralizam na nacionalnoj razini, dozvoljavajući medijskim 
tvrkama da se šire u različitim medijima zajedničke tržišne zone. 
Te suprotstavljene politike bit će razmatrane pregledom odluka Europske Komi-
sije o medijima u Uniji, a članak će pokazati da iako pojedine članice zadržavaju 
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pravo jačanja regulativa o medijskoj koncentraciji, čini se da u situaciji preuzima-
nja većina članica nema snage da podupre medijski pluralizam. To nedvojbeno 
ostavlja regulatornu prazninu između nacionalnih i supranacionalnih regulatornih 
sfera, a pitanje medijske koncentracije se zanemaruje u korist kompanija i na štetu 
medijskog pluralizma. 
 
Ključne riječi:  Europska Komisija, medijski pluralizam, regulatorni pristup, tele-
vizijska proizvodnja, komercijalna televizija 
 
